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Involuntary Competence in United States Criminal Law
Stephen J. Morse*

1. Introduction
This chapter addresses whether in the United States the state has the right
to forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant or prisoner to restore
competence, including competence to stand trial, competence to plead guilty
and to waive trial rights, competence to represent himself, and competence to
be sentenced.1 Other legal systems may treat this as primarily a mental health
law question addressed best by mental health laws, but in the United States,
it is a criminal law question although some courts are very deferential to the
judgment of mental health professionals.
The chapter first presents the legal and mental health background
concerning incompetence and the right of prisoners generally to refuse
psychotropic medication. Although the relevant cases are important and
deserve sustained analysis in their own right, for the purposes of this chapter,
they are presented only as the basis for addressing the article's central
question. The next part turns specifically to the claim that the state does
have the right forcibly to treat, primarily to medicate with psychotropic
substances, solely to restore various competencies. The general thesis is that
in appropriate cases, finality in the criminal process is such an important
value that the state should have the power to forcibly medicate an
incompetent defendant or prisoner who refuses medication.
2. Legal and Mental Health Background
This section of the chapter addresses various competencies, the
permissibility of involuntary medication generally, some general
procedural issues concerning incompetence, and concludes with
information about the mental health and treatment issues.
Criminal Competencies
Other chapters explore the competence doctrines themselves, so I shall
only provide sufficient information to motivate the main question of
*
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Forcible medication to restore competence to be executed is an issue in the United States,
but since volume will be read by many people who live in countries that do not impose
capital punishment, the editors have asked me to omit discussion of this issue to conform to
the volume’s word limits. I have discussed the issue in Stephen Morse, ‘Mental Disorder
and Criminal Law’ (2011) 101 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 895.
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involuntary treatment. I will not explore in any depth the theoretical bases
for these doctrines, which have been ably addressed by Bonnie, Saks, and
Schopp.2 In the succeeding sections of the chapter, I shall assume that a
defendant has properly been found incompetent according to the applicable
standard in the jurisdiction and will not address the wisdom of various
different competence tests.
In three important cases, Dusky v. United States, Pate v. Robinson, and
Drope v. Missouri,3 the United States Supreme Court created the
federal constitutional doctrine governing incompetence to stand criminal
trial. The first, a brief per curiam opinion, involved a statutory interpretation
of the then applicable incompetence to stand trial provision of the federal
code. The Court held that it was not sufficient to find competence simply
because "the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some
recollection of events." Rather, the test was
Whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.4
Although the case did not impose this standard on the states as an
invariant constitutional requirement, the standard it adopted for federal
criminal cases has been very influential with legislatures and courts that
have addressed the Issue. The current federal standard is similar. A
defendant will be found mentally incompetent to stand trial if the defendant,
is presently [sic] suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense

2

Richard J. Bonnie, ‘The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation’ (1992) 10 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 291; Richard J. Bonnie, ‘The
Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope’ (1993) 47 University of
Miami Law Review 539; Elyn R. Saks, Refusing Care: Treatment and the Rights of the
Mentally Ill (University of Chicago 2002); Robert F. Schopp, ‘Involuntary Treatment and
Competence to Proceed in the Criminal Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases’ (2006) 24
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 495.
3
Dusky v United States 36 US 402 (1960); Pate v Robinson 383 US 375 (1966); Drope v
Missouri 420 US 162 (1974).
4
Dusky v United States 36 US 402, 402.
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Pate held that the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent violated
the due process right to a fair trial, thus cementing the constitutional status
of the prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant. The Court
also observed that it was contradictory to claim that an incompetent
defendant could waive the right to have his competence determined.
Drope noted that the prohibition against trying incompetent defendants
is fundamental to an adversary process. The Court held that due process
requires that, at any time during criminal proceedings that a defendant's
competence seems to be in question, further inquiry is required. The
Court wrote that "There are ... no fixed or immutable signs which
invariably indicate the need for further inquiry ... ",5 and that deciding to
do so was often a difficult inquiry, calling for the exercise of judgment.
The rationale for the constitutional doctrine, which is rooted in the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, appears straightforward: A
defendant cannot receive a fair trial if he or she is incompetent. After all, if
a defendant does not understand what is happening or cannot assist counsel,
the defendant's ability to help guide his or her own defense will be
substantially impaired because the defendant will not be able rationally to
make crucial decisions, such as whether to testify in his own defense or to
raise various claims, and he will not be able to assist counsel to defeat the
prosecution's case. Accuracy and autonomy interests are therefore
compromised. Moreover, it undermines the dignity of the criminal trial
process to try an incompetent defendant. Although these are undoubtedly
weighty concerns, there is reason to believe that the defendant's competence
may not be as practically important to achieving a fair trial as the Court
implicitly assumed.6 Nevertheless, the constitutional prohibition against
trying incompetent defendants is now clear and settled. As Justice
Blackmun wrote, "It is axiomatic by now that criminal prosecution of
an incompetent defendant offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment".7
In Godinez, the Court considered whether the standard for competence to
plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel should differ from the standard for
competence to stand trial. Pleading guilty waives all of a defendant's
criminal justice rights, including the right to be tried and the right to remain
silent. Although the Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants have a
5

Drope v Missouri 420 US 162, 180 (1974).
See, e.g., Robert A. Burt and Norval Morris, ‘A Proposal for the Abolition of the
Incompetency Plea’ (1972) 40 Chicago Law Review 66; see also Bruce J. Winick,
‘Incompetence to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for
Reform’ (1987) 39 Rutgers Law Review 243.
7
Godinez v Moran 509 US 389 (1993).
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constitutional right to waive counsel and to represent themselves,8 waiver of
the right to counsel is weighty because counsel usually plays a crucial role
in mounting an effective criminal defense. Therefore, the waiver must be
knowing and intelligent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
waiving these rights required a higher level of mental functioning than that
needed to stand trial and it imposed a standard of "reasoned choice" among
the available alternatives, rather than the Dusky rational understanding
standard.9
In a controversial decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
same standard, rational understanding, should apply, and questioning whether
the reasoned choice test was really a higher standard. There were substantial
arguments suggesting that a different, higher standard should be required
for competence to plead guilty and to waive counsel,10 many of which the
dissent addressed. Although different "skills" may in theory be necessary
successfully to accomplish different tasks, such as assisting counsel and
deciding whether to plead guilty, it is not clear that the allegedly higher
standard that the Court rejected, "reasoned choice," would make much
difference in practice. Rational understanding and reasoned choice are both
vague formulations that provide little guidance. Whichever words are used
to express the standard, the test should be a functional and contextdependent rationality standard, focusing on what skills are demanded in
a particular context. Waiver of distinct constitutional rights implicates
distinct rational understandings of each right waived. Thus, a defendant who
appears to have general rational understanding may appear on close
examination to lack that understanding for a particular trial right. If the trial
court makes a careful inquiry concerning whether a particular waiver is
knowing and voluntary, the more general and specific inquiries should
merge, as the Godinez dissent recognized. Once again, however, what is
necessary is not a distinct formulation for competence to plead guilty or to
waive the right to counsel, but a context-dependent evaluation by the trial
court of the defendant's rational capacities necessary in each context.
Finally, if a different or higher standard had been imposed, it is by no
means clear that trial courts would have behaved much differently and
appellate courts would seldom overturn a trial court's substantive
determination that a defendant was or was not competent. In any case, then,
for constitutional purposes, once again the issue is settled. Rational
understanding and the ability to assist counsel are constitutionally sufficient
standards for competence to stand trial, to plead guilty, and to waive one's
8

Faretta v California 422 US 806 (1975).
Moran v Godinez 972 F2d 263, 266 (9th Cir 1992).
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Richard J. Bonnie, ‘The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation’ (1992) 10 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 291.
4
9

rights. Congress or the states are of course entitled to impose higher standards
for any aspect of competence in criminal pre-trial and trial proceedings, but
the Constitution requires no more.
Should a criminal defendant who meets the Godinez standard for waiving
the right to counsel, which is essentially the competence to stand trial
standard, be permitted to proceed pro se if he suffers from serious mental
disorder? The constitutional right to proceed pro se announced by the
Supreme Court in Faretta v. California11 does not depend on the defendant’s
ability to function as an able defense counsel. As long as the defendant
understands the consequences of representing himself, he is entitled to do so.
Consequently, one would have thought that as long as a defendant with severe
mental disorder understood what he was doing, he would be entitled to
represent himself.
Nevertheless, in Indiana v. Edwards,12 the Supreme Court held
otherwise, in my view unpersuasively distinguishing Godinez on the grounds
that the issue of self-representation was not raised in the previous case and
that Godinez involved permitting a defendant to represent himself whereas
the instant case involved a state trying to prevent the defendant from doing
so. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer cautioned against trying to apply
a unitary competence standard to address two very different questions:
whether a represented defendant is capable of going to trial and “whether a
defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.”13
Instead, Justice Breyer tried to apply a more nuanced understanding of
competency that properly considered context. He recognized that a defendant
with mental disorder might be able to assist counsel but might nonetheless be
too disabled to perform basic trial tasks at even a minimal level. He therefore
worried that an apparently unfair trial could result. Discretion was left in the
hands of trial judges to decide if a defendant is competent to represent himself
even if he is competent to stand trial.
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutional
standard, if any, for competence to be sentenced. This issue does not arise
with great frequency because any offender about to be sentenced was
competent to plead guilty or to stand trial. Nonetheless, an offender’s mental
condition may have deteriorated between plea or trial and sentencing or there
may be a specific problem about sentencing that is not inconsistent with plea
or trial competence. Criteria vary, but the essential question is whether the
defendant is capable of understanding what is happening to him and why, and
is able to speak for himself and to assist counsel. Lower courts have
essentially employed the test for competence to be executed adopted by the
11

Faretta v California 422 US 806 (1975).
Indiana v Edwards 554 US 164 (2008).
13
Indiana v Edwards 554 US 164, 175 (2008).
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Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright,14 which requires that the prisoner is
able to understand what sentence is being imposed and why. Some lower
courts and commentators have also imposed or suggested further
requirements.15 I believe it is fair to say that the necessity of sentencing
competence is assumed for some of the same reasons that support the bar on
trying an incompetent defendant. It is inconsistent with both the offender’s
dignity and autonomy and the dignity of the law to impose a punishment on
an offender who does not understand what is happening. Perhaps more
important, an incompetent offender cannot adequately participate in the
sentencing process, which may make it more difficult for the defense to argue
for mitigation, thus reducing the fairness of the sentencing process.
Involuntary Psychotropic Medication
In Washington v. Harper,16 the Supreme Court considered whether the
state may involuntarily treat a prison inmate with psychotropic medication.
The Court held that although Harper had a substantive liberty right under the
Due Process Clause to be free of unwanted medication, the state also had a
legitimate interest in reducing the danger a mentally disordered, violent inmate
poses. The Due Process Clause therefore permits involuntary treatment with
antipsychotic medication if the inmate is a danger to himself or others and the
treatment is medically justified in the inmate's interest. In brief, the state's
interest sometimes outweighed the prisoner's liberty interest and antipsychotic
medication was found to be a rational means to effectuate the State interest.
Moreover, the Court did not require a prior finding of incompetence and
judicial approval of the treatment using a substituted judgment standard.
Finally, the Court found that potential alternatives to antipsychotic
medication, such as seclusion or restraints, had not been shown to protect the
inmate's liberty interest in freedom from medication at minimal cost to
penological interests.
The most important Supreme Court decision prior to Sell v. United
States17 bearing on the state's right involuntarily to medicate a criminal
defendant who is incompetent to stand trial is Riggins v. Nevada.18 In
Riggins, the Supreme Court considered whether the forced administration
of antipsychotic medication to a defendant during trial violated rights
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reaffirmed the Harper reasoning and holding and wrote that the Fourteenth
14

Ford v Wainwright 477 US 399 (1986).
John Parry and Eric Y. Drogin, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence
and Testimony (American Bar Association 2009) 103-104.
16
Washington v Harper 494 US 211 (1990).
17
Sell v United States 539 US 166 (2003).
18
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127 (1992).
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Amendment provides "at least as much protection" to criminal defendants
as to inmates.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found that there was a
substantial probability that Riggins' trial for murder may have been prejudiced
by the heavy doses of medication he was forced to take during trial.
Although the treatment was medically indicated, Nevada had provided no
evidence that involuntary medication was "necessary to accomplish an
essential state policy" that would justify the potential prejudice to Riggins.
As examples of such prejudice, the Court noted the possibility of untoward
effects on Riggins' own testimony, on his interaction with counsel, and on his
ability to comprehend the trial proceedings. The majority thus explicitly
recognized the possibility that antipsychotic medication might prejudice a
criminal defendant's rights at trial. It also noted that, “... the State might have
been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the
drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of... guilt or
innocence by using less intrusive means"19 [emphasis added] and that "trial
prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state interest".20 Thus,
the majority strongly implied that adjudication of guilt or innocence might
be an essential State interest that would justify involuntary medication in
some cases, even if prejudice might result. The Court specifically declined
to decide "whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at
trial"21 because the issue did not arise in this case. Finally, the Court did not
adopt any standard of review for deciding such questions. In sum, the
majority left open the standard of review to be applied and whether
adjudication of guilt or innocence was such an essential state interest that it
would outweigh a competent defendant's liberty interest in refusing medication
and his interest in avoiding prejudice at trial.
In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote that “... the
medical and pharmacological data ... indicate that involuntary medication
with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's right to a fair
trial.22 He expressed the opinion that the state would therefore have to make
an "extraordinary showing"23 before it could involuntarily medicate a defendant for the purpose of restoring competence and he expressly doubted that
this showing could be made in most cases considering the properties of the
drugs then available. Justice Kennedy likened forcible medication that
changed a defendant's behavior to the prosecution's manipulation of material
19

Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 135 (1992) [emphasis added].
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 138 (1992).
21
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 136 (1992).
22
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 138 (1992).
23
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 139 (1992).
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evidence. He wrote that the state would need to show that there is "no
significant risk that the medication would impair or alter in any material way
the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to
assist his counsel."24
Justice Kennedy also worried that altering the defendant's demeanor might
have an outcome-influencing, prejudicial effect on the defendant's
constitutional rights at all stages of the proceedings, especially the right to
testify in his own defense, and that side effects might hamper the attorney–
client relation, " ... preventing effective communication and rendering the
defendant less able or willing to take part in his defense."25 Justice Kennedy
closed his concurrence, however, by noting that psychopharmacological
treatment is evolving and by recognizing that future treatments might not
cause the behavioral alterations that concerned him.
Procedural Issues
The state must adopt valid procedures to determine when involuntary
medication is appropriate and necessary to restore the defendant's
competence and, in appropriate cases, whether medication will unduly
prejudice the defendant. It also seems clear that appellate courts have
jurisdiction to review non-final, trial court authorizations of involuntary
medication. The most important questions are whether there must be a
judicial hearing before forcibly medicating the incompetent defendant, and,
if so, what burden of persuasion the state should meet. As a matter of
constitutional law, deciding what procedure is due usually involves
consideration of four factors: the individual and state interests, the value of
the proposed procedures, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights the
current procedures may pose.26 Given the importance of the individual right
to liberty that will be abridged, it seems clear that some form of hearing is
required and that the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, although
important on the issues of the medical appropriateness and necessity of
medication, will not be sufficient (compare Vitek v. Jones, with Youngberg v.
Romeo).27
In the contexts of transfer from prison to a mental hospital (Vitek),28 the
commitment of minors (Parham v. J.R.),29 the involuntary treatment of
mentally disordered and dangerous prisoners (Harper),30 and the right of
civilly committed patients to refuse treatment,31 administrative hearings have
24

Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 141 (1992).
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 144 (1992).
26
See Matthews v Eldridge 424 US 319 (1976).
27
Cf. Vitek v Jones 445 US 480 (1980) with Youngberg v Romeo 457 US 307 (1982).
28
Vitek v Jones 445 US 480 (1980).
29
Parham v JR 442 US 584 (1979).
30
Washington v Harper 494 US 211 (1990).
31
See, e.g., Rennie v Klein 462 F Supp 1131 (D NJ 1973).
8
25

been held sufficient. Although an advisor is often required, there is generally no
right to be represented by counsel or by a truly independent advisor.32 The usual
rationale for these holdings is that the decision being made is essentially medical
and that requiring a full judicial hearing would be unnecessary for accurate
determination and inefficient.
The context of involuntary medication to restore competence is arguably
distinguishable, however. Although the precedents in the other contexts suggest
that the determination has substantial medical aspects, deciding whether the
governmental interest is sufficient to override the defendant's autonomy and
bodily integrity and thus to medicate to restore competence is a core legal
question. What is at issue is not simply a question of medical appropriateness
and institutional management (and even these are ultimately legal questions).
For examples, as Riggins33 first made clear, legal rights are in question, and,
deciding whether medication will unduly prejudice trial rights is a purely legal
question. Thus, there will be substantial value in permitting a genuine adversary
process before a neutral judge, with defendant represented by counsel.
There is little authority on the government's burden of persuasion
concerning involuntary medication. Although the defendant's interest in
avoiding an unfair trial is strong, it is constitutional for the state to place the
burden of persuasion to prove incompetence to stand trial on the defendant
(Medina v. California;34 but compare Cooper v. Oklahoma,35 holding
unconstitutional the requirement that the defendant must prove incompetence
by the intermediate, clear and convincing evidence, standard). This might
suggest that the preponderance standard would be sufficient to determine
whether the defendant might be involuntarily medicated. On the other hand,
involuntary medication involves both the risk of an unfair trial and a basic
intrusion on autonomy and liberty. The individual's interest in being free of
unwanted medication is substantial, as is the risk of error and harm. Although not
as serious as a criminal conviction, involuntary medication is a serious
abridgement of liberty and the individual and the state should seemingly not
have to share the risk of error equally. Thus, the intermediate, clear and
convincing, standard has much justification in this context.
A final procedural issue is whether trial courts should appoint a guardian ad
32

The United States Supreme Court will soon decide whether a defendant in a capital
sentencing proceeding is entitled to the provision of an independent mental health
professional to assist him. McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (Jan. 13, 2017). I assume
that the Court would find the issues of guilt and punishment distinguishable from the
question of competence, but, as a normative matter, the issue of competence is sufficiently
important to warrant the provision of an independent mental health professional to assist
him.
33
Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127 (1992).
34
Medina v California 505 US 437 (1992).
35
Cooper v Oklahoma 517 US 348 (1996).
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litem to represent a defendant's medical interests. If the guardian consented, the
state could medicate. If the guardian objected, the necessity for medication
would still have to be assessed by the trial court. Thus, it is unclear what role the
guardian would play. Counsel is presumably capable of developing the medical
evidence that might show that medication is not medically appropriate or not
likely to restore the defendant's competence.
Mental Health & Treatment Issues
Whether a defendant is incompetent and whether a defendant suffers from
mental disorder, which includes intellectual disability (formerly termed
developmental disability and mental retardation) are distinct issues.
Although criminal defendants might be incompetent to plead or to stand
trial for reasons other than mental disorder,36 such as insufficient education
or experience, many incompetence standards require the presence of a
mental disorder as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition. Moreover, in
practice, problems with competence are usually associated with mental
disorder and those found incompetent are typically treated with mental
health interventions37 or in the case of intellectual disability, with
psychoeducational methods. Initially, research indicated that
incompetence was especially associated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia
and psychotic symptoms.38 More recent research, although confirming
the strong association between incompetence and schizophrenia and
psychotic symptoms, indicates that other disorders, too, are associated with
incompetence.39 Nonetheless, people with schizophrenia and those suffering
from psychotic symptoms generally are the largest group found incompetent
to stand trial. This chapter will therefore address only the involuntary
antipsychotic medication of incompetent defendants with psychotic
symptoms who are being medicated solely for the purpose of restoring
competence.
Even after antipsychotic medication became available, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Jackson v. Indiana,40 which prohibited indefinite
involuntary civil confinement solely for the purpose of restoring competence
to stand trial unless there was a reasonable chance of restoration, suggested
36

Jodi Viljoen, Ronald Roesch, and Patricia Zapf, ‘An Examination of the Relationship
between Competency to Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and
Psychopathology’ (2002) 26 Law and Human Behavior 481.
37
Norman Poythress and others, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies
(Kluwer-Plenum 2002).
38
Robert Nicholson and Karen Kugler, ‘Competent and Incompetent Defendants: A
Quantitative Review of Comparative Research’ (1991) 109 Psychological Bulletin 355.
39
Norman Poythress and others, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies
(Kluwer-Plenum 2002).
40
Jackson v Indiana 406 US 715 (1972).
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that large numbers of incompetent defendants could not be restored to
competence. Nonetheless, for the last four decades, antipsychotic
medication has provided the most efficient means to restore a psychotic
defendant's competence, although not the only means.
Psychotropic medication is not a panacea, however. A substantial
number of patients do not respond, even to the most effective agents. All
the drugs have side effects that can be extremely serious and unpleasant,
and the drugs do not provide life skills that the person did not formerly
possess. Antipsychotic treatment has changed considerably since Riggins
was decided. The newer, so-called atypical antipsychotic medications are
now widely in use, and can be effective even for those patients refractory to
the traditional drugs. Most informed professionals believe that they are the
first-line treatment of choice for people with schizophrenia. It now appears,
however, that they are generally not more effective than the first generation
of antipsychotic medications and the side-effect profile is less benign than
originally thought.41 About 40% of voluntary patients taking either
generation of antipsychotic drugs discontinue use, primarily because of side
effects. Antipsychotic medication for the purpose of restoring competence
will be administered for a relatively brief period of time, however, thus
reducing the risk of the deleterious consequences of long-term
treatment that some antipsychotic medications present.
If a defendant who is a candidate for antipsychotic medication refuses to
take it, administration requires either particularly intrusive, forcible oral
administration or a forcible injection of agents that can be administered this
way. The risks of side effects will never disappear. In appropriate pre-trial
cases, such as if the defendant is not dangerous and poses no flight risk,
there is no need for inpatient commitment. Medication can be provided on
an outpatient basis. If the defendant does not comply with appointments,
hospitalization can then be ordered. Even if the person responds well to
psychotropic medication and regains reasonable cognitive control, some
educational interventions may also be necessary to prepare the defendant
for a criminal trial. These, too, can be provided on an outpatient basis in
appropriate cases.
Despite the difficulties, medication will be the first treatment of choice
for most defendants who are incompetent because they are out of touch with
reality. Prescription of psychotropic medication is usually empiricallybased because there are few established links between a specific diagnostic
41

Jeffrey A. Lieberman and others, ‘Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with
Chronic Schizophrenia’ (2005) 353 New England Journal of Medicine 1209; Peter B.
Jones, Thomas R.E. Barnes, and Linda Davies, ‘Randomized Controlled Trial of the Effect
on Quality of Life of Second- vs First-Generation Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia’
(2006) 63 Archives of General Psychiatry 1079.
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assessment and a specific drug. The therapist typically starts with one from
among a class of drugs that has the highest benefit–cost profile. After a trial
of a few months, if the patient does not respond, a different drug is tried,
and so on. If the patient who is incompetent as a result of psychosis has not
responded to any drug over the course of six months, then the therapist can
order clozapine. Clozapine is effective with a high percentage of nonresponders but has extremely dangerous, potentially fatal side effects that
require careful monitoring. If the patient still fails to respond, then it is
reasonably safe to conclude that none of the available drug therapies is
likely to restore the person’s contact with reality.42 In virtually all cases, a
determination can be made within six to nine months that the defendant is
or is not treatable. Most defendants are restored to competence within six
months.43 Nonetheless, the potential for lengthy commitment remains and
can be abused, but there is no need for longer commitment to restore any
competence. A conclusion of irreversibility can be reached and further
commitment for restoration is unjustified.
Whether antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate and
necessary to restore competence are essentially medical and psychological
questions that mental health professionals can best judge. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that such questions are primarily medical or
psychological. As long as professional judgment is adequately exercised,
courts will and should be unwilling to override professional judgment on this
issue. The state's interest, balanced against the defendant's substantial liberty
interest, would not require certainty that forcible antipsychotic medication
would restore competence. It would be sufficient if a standard of reasonable
medical certainty were met. Of course, the ultimate question of whether the
defendant must be forcibly medicated is nonetheless legal.
On the other hand, professionals and courts will need to be sensitive to the
possibility of using less intrusive means than medication to restore competence.
As noted, the risk/benefit ratio of antipsychotic agents is acceptable for transient
treatment, but they must be administered highly intrusively to defendants who
refuse to consent to treatment. In contrast, psychosocial or educational methods
may enable the restoration of competence without medication or with less
medication than would otherwise be required44 and such methods are almost
42

Beng-Choon Ho and others, ‘Schizophrenia and other Psychotic Disorders’ in Robert E.
Hales and Stuart C. Yudofksy (eds), Textbook of Clinical Psychiatry (4th edn, American
Psychiatric Publishing Inc. 2003); Lauren B. Marangell, ‘Psychopharmacology and
Electroconvulsive Therapy’ in Robert E. Hales and Stuart C. Yudofksy (eds), Textbook of
Clinical Psychiatry (4th edn, American Psychiatric Publishing Inc. 2003).
43
Norman Poythress and others, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies
(Kluwer-Plenum 2002) 51.
44
Kirk Heilbrun, Michael Radelet, and Joel Dvoskin, ‘The Debate on Treating Individuals
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always less intrusive than forcible medication.45 If such methods are potentially
useful, they should be tried first because medication must be necessary to
justify forcible administration. Courts will evaluate whether medication is
necessary, but it is doubtful that they will override professional judgment that
is adequately exercised. Sell has once again adopted this position in the context
of trial competence, but it should be applied broadly.
Before turning to the doctrines and arguments concerning involuntary
competence, let us consider whether a defendant who is incompetent in some
part of the criminal process may nonetheless be competent to make a
treatment decision, including the refusal of psychotropic medication. As we
have seen, these agents can have serious side effects and there can be good
reasons to refuse unrelated to a tactical decision concerning the criminal
process. Objections based on religious belief are a classic example. In
theory, it is possible that a defendant with mental disorder might be
incompetent to stand trial but competent to refuse medication. The modern
view of competence generally is that it can be relatively domain-specific, with
diminished competence in some areas of functioning and not in others. On
the other hand, Robert Schopp has argued convincingly that an incompetent
defendant will also be incompetent to refuse treatment in virtually all cases.46
I shall argue that in almost all contexts, the government should have the right
to treat incompetent defendants whether or not they are competent to refuse
treatment.
3. Involuntary Competence

This section begins with consideration of the general issues underlying
whether it is permissible to medicate a defendant solely for the purpose of
restoring competence. Then it turns to the discrete doctrinal contexts in
which the issue arises.
Individual Interests
Harper and Riggins confirm what was already clear: Involuntary
antipsychotic medication administered for the purpose of restoring
competence implicates important individual and state interests, both of which
must be considered to determine whether this practice is constitutionally
acceptable. In Harper, the Court referred to the citizen's interest in avoiding
unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication as a "significant
Incompetent for Execution’ (1992) 149 American Journal of Psychiatry 596; Alex Siegel
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liberty interest." Whether the Court was signaling that this interest is
fundamental, thus necessitating strict scrutiny of its abridgment in some
contexts, is unclear, but it certainly means that this is an important interest.
Harper nonetheless applied only rational basis review in upholding
involuntary medication. As many courts have pointed out, however,
Harper is distinguishable from cases involving involuntary medication to
restore competence because Harper concerned prison administration, a
context in which deference is granted to the needs of prison administration,
rather than crucial, trial-related rights.
Even if antipsychotic treatment is medically appropriate and the benefit/risk
ratio is quite favorable, the individual's interest in refusing unwanted
treatment is weighty because it includes the rights to dignity, bodily integrity
and autonomy. In our political and legal system, no one has the right to
invade another's body or to make medical decisions for another without the
agent's consent if the agent is competent. People can refuse even the most
sensible medical treatments for any reason they wish, including for no reason
at all. In this instance, there may be many good reasons for refusing indicated
antipsychotic medication, including the fear of unpleasant and sometimes
disabling and even fatal side effects. In our political, moral and legal culture,
it is widely believed that respect for the agent's autonomy is a deontological
good. Thus, even apparently irrational decisions will be respected. It is also
believed that in general agents are the best judges of their own interests.
Medicating solely to restore competence is distinguishable from cases in which
treatment is sought for the patient's own good or for the safety of others. The
state is medicating so that it may proceed with the criminal justice process.
There is thus an undoubted invasion of the defendant’s dignity, bodily integrity
and autonomy. The issue is whether the state’s interests justify such an
invasion.
Some believe and many courts have held that involuntary psychotropic
medication also infringes upon First Amendment rights to freedom of
thought and expression.47 Antipsychotic medication does affect cognition
and thus thought and expression. Further, if one denies the disease concept
of mental disorder and the status of psychotic mentation and perception as
symptoms, a once popular but now minority view at best, then the First
Amendment argument gains strength. Moreover, at the margins, distinguishing psychotic thought from idiosyncratic or unusual thought may
sometimes be difficult. In addition, some people with psychosis may
rationally prefer to remain psychotic because the psychotic state seems more
desirable than more realistic recognition of their life situation.48
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The First Amendment rationale for objecting to involuntary psychotropic
medication has been intensely criticized despite its initial plausibility.49
Reducing usually ego-alien psychotic symptoms of undoubted thought
disorder that cause significant distress or dysfunction would appear to
increase freedom of thought rather than to decrease it. Rather than producing
"synthetic sanity," in most cases the medication returns the sufferer to a
baseline condition of more normal functioning, much as other medicines do
for physical diseases. Most mental health professionals understand the
difference between disorder and mere difference, and manifestly psychotic
thinking is seldom hard to recognize. In most cases, the "freedom" to be
psychotic does not seem to be a freedom worth having or freedom at all. In
the present context, defendants are refusing medication to remain
incompetent, not to achieve the subjective benefits of remaining psychotic (or
to avoid aversive side effects). Finally, in some cases, such as incompetence
to stand trial, the defendant can refuse medication after competence is
restored and the process, e.g., plea, trial, sentencing, has concluded (unless the
state has another sufficient interest to medicate forcibly). In sum, the First
Amendment claim seems weak in this context.
Criminal defendants (and society) have an undeniable interest in receiving
fair processes, including the avoidance of prejudice at trial. The primary
rationale supporting the prohibition against trying incompetent defendants is
that incompetence prevents them from receiving a fair trial. It would seem be
inconsistent, however, to employ methods to permit a trial to proceed that
would themselves unduly compromise fairness. The question, then, is
whether involuntary antipsychotic medication would so prejudice the
defendant's right to a fair trial that Due Process would be violated, even if the
state has an essential interest.
In the United States the vast majority of criminal defendants, especially in
federal cases, do not go to trial, but plead guilty instead. Thus, although most
discussion of prejudice has focused on trial prejudice, the issue will arise in
relatively few cases. Moreover, we may assume that antipsychotic medication
that restores competence to plead guilty or to waive rights will virtually never
prejudice the hearings that consider these issues. At plea and waiver hearings,
judges are being asked whether or not to accept a plea or waiver and not to
adjudicate guilt. This decision is unlikely to be prejudiced by the types of
problem that will occur at trial itself.
As Riggins indicated, antipsychotic medication could affect many trial
rights by interfering with the defendant's memory, ability to consult with
and the Wish to be Crazy’(1976) 33 Archives of General Psychiatry 1443.
49
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counsel, and the ability to testify. Altering demeanor might also interfere with
other trial rights. First, it might undermine the persuasiveness of an insanity
defense by making the defendant appear "normal." Some empirical research
demonstrates that juries that believe the defendant is manifesting psychotic
symptoms at trial are more likely to acquit by reason of insanity than jurors who
believe the defendant is free of symptoms at trial.50 Second, altering
demeanor might also generally prejudice the factfinder by making the
defendant appear lacking in remorse or concern, an issue that also plays a role
at sentencing.
These are serious concerns, as Justice Kennedy indicated in Riggins. Antipsychotic medication at proper dosage levels typically does not sedate the
defendant or otherwise impair a person’s abilities. Rather, if effective, it
restores cognitive functioning and should enhance the defendant’s
performance. Courts must clearly assess the potential for prejudice and should
apply any reasonable remedies, including instructions, that might reduce such
prejudice. And many of these concerns can be alleviated by effective
advocacy. Lower courts have assumed that undue prejudice can be avoided in
most cases.
It seems clear that a defendant should not have a constitutionally protected
right to refuse psychotropic medication solely for the purpose of avoiding
criminal trial or otherwise to delay or impede the criminal process. Some
defendants would understandably prefer to delay or to avoid trial for tactical
purposes or for other reasons concerning personal comfort, and such motives
surely cause some defendants to raise the issue of incompetence. Nonetheless,
a defendant has no legitimate right to "game" the system by refusing a treatment
that might restore him or her to competence, no matter who raises the issue of
competence. Moreover, a defendant who could be restored to competence may
in some cases, such as incompetence to stand trial, remain committed under
Jackson, thus forcing the state to bear the expense of costly confinement. The
state should not have to absorb such a cost unless there is strong justification for
it. Now, there are many justifiable reasons a defendant might want to refuse
anti-psychotic medication, such as fear of side effects, but refusing medically
appropriate treatment solely for the purpose of delaying or avoiding a criminal
trial does not seem justifiable.
Standing alone, the psychotic individual's interest in bodily integrity and
autonomy are strong, but the interest in freedom of thought seems less
powerful. The defendant also has a substantial interest in avoiding trial
prejudice, but little legally cognizable interest in refusing medically
50
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appropriate treatment solely for the purpose of preventing trial or the
continuation of the criminal process.
State Interests
The state interest in adjudicating guilt and innocence and achieving
finality in the criminal process is concededly "essential" or important. In
Riggins, for example, Justice O'Connor quotes Justice Brennan's concurrence
in Allen v. Illinois:51 "Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is
fundamental to scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice
and peace."52 U.S. v. Weston,53 which presents a thorough and representative
discussion of the state interests, concluded that it is "essential." The opinion
pointed to the many statements by the Supreme Court that the government
has a compelling interest in apprehending, convicting and punishing
criminals. The state interest is not only incapacitation, but also "demonstrating
that transgressions of society's prohibitions will be met with an appropriate
response by punishing offenders."54 The opinion rejects civil commitment as
a viable alternative because
The civil commitment argument assumes that the government's essential
penological interests lie only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. It
ignores the retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative
functions of the criminal justice system, which serve to insure that
offenders receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail
consequences, and to discover what happened through the public
mechanism of trial. Civil commitment addresses none of these
interests.55
Acquittal of the innocent is also achieved only in the criminal justice system.
Weston concluded that trying a defendant is the only constitutionally acceptable
means for the state to further the essential interest in adjudicating guilt and
innocence.
To assess the importance of this interest, consider an analogous problem.56
Suppose that obtaining the testimony of the sole material witness to a crime
was the only effective means by which a state could effectively try a defendant.
Not only does the state have the right to compel such testimony—by providing
immunity, if necessary, and by the threat of contempt—but the state also has
51
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the right to incarcerate a material witness who will flee the jurisdiction. The
state interest in trying a criminal defendant must be weighty if it justifies such
substantial intrusions on the liberty of a person other than the defendant and
who may be entirely innocent. Indeed, the state interest might even be sufficient
to medicate the material witness involuntarily if this were the only means to
restore competence to testify.
Assuming that the state interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence may be
essential, must it always be essential? For example, U.S. v. Brandon 57 held
that the state interest would not be essential in less serious crimes. Weston took
no position on that issue because defendant Weston was charged with multiple
murders and the government's interest in prevention of danger is unparalleled
in such cases of obvious threat. Weston implied, however, that the seriousness
of the crime might be a criterion for deciding whether the state interest was
substantial. U.S. v. Gomes58 rejected a bright line rule in favor of case-specific
weighing, and pointed to the breadth of the harm a type of crime created and to
the dangerousness of the defendant as the most important factors. As we shall
see in the next sub-section, Sell at least theoretically settled this question for
the purpose of restoring competence to stand trial.
Incapacitation is less weighty for less serious crimes, but some of the other
interests, such as retribution, adjudication, and communication, would be
equally well served by trying less serious cases. Moreover, it is not clear what
should count as a serious crime. In United States v. Jones,59 for example, the
Supreme Court considered whether the Constitution permitted indefinite
confinement of a person who was committed following a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity on a charge of shoplifting a jacket. The Court was
unwilling to limit indefinite commitment for dangerousness to those who had
committed crimes of "violence" and was willing to characterize non-violent
theft as sufficiently dangerous constitutionally to justify potentially life-long
confinement to protect the public. It is reasonable to conclude that the state's
interest in trying all defendants is as strong as the state's interest in protecting
the public from mentally disordered, non-violent people who shoplift.
Moreover, potentially indefinite confinement is a much greater infringement
of liberty than transient antipsychotic treatment for the purpose of restoring
competence. Nonetheless, if one is balancing the interests, state interests are
diminished as the seriousness of the crime or the dangerousness of the criminal
decreases.
The most general, implicit objection to the state’s strong interest in
finality is that involuntary medication to restore competence violates the basic
57
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integrity of the American system of accusatorial, adversarial criminal justice
because one party, the state, is permitted to intervene involuntarily in the mental
processes of its adversary, the defendant. Although plausible, this objection
seems unpersuasive. The essential state interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence
and pursuing the consequences of guilt to their conclusion and the interest of all
parties in fair process are undeniable. The defendant has no right to avoid
adjudication if there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed or
to avoid the consequences of guilt if the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted.
Thus, the only question is whether involuntary medication of the defendant
undermines the fairness of trial or the defendant's ability to help produce the
strongest possible defense. If it does not, then the state will meet a fully
adversarial defense. Indeed, to the extent that the defendant's mental capacities
are improved by the medication, it is likely to improve the quality of the
defense. Involuntary medication does not compromise the independence of
the defense. As long as the medication is medically appropriate and is being
used solely for the legitimate purpose of restoring competence, involuntary
medication by the state seems neither unseemly on its face nor a violation of
the values of the adversarial system.
Competence to Stand Trial
In Sell v. United States,60 the Supreme Court addressed whether and
under what conditions the state could forcibly medicate an incompetent
defendant for the purpose of restoring the defendant’s competence to stand
trial. The Court agreed, as it had previously in Harper, that citizens have a
strong liberty interest in being free of unwanted medical interventions. The
Court nonetheless held that an incompetent defendant could be involuntarily
medicated if four conditions were met: the treatment was medically
appropriate, the governmental interest was strong because the charges were
serious, the treatment would not cause trial prejudice, and less restrictive
means of restoring competence were not effective. The Court did express a
preference for treating the defendant under an independent and less fraught
rationale, however, such as the Harper rationale based on the defendant’s
dangerousness. Not all incompetent defendants satisfy such an independent
rationale for involuntary treatment and trial courts have to apply the Sell
criteria. Although Sell appears to put serious restrictions on the state’s ability
to forcibly medicate, in practice the limitations are not substantial, especially
in federal cases.61
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Three of Sell’s conditions are appropriate, although the issue of trial
prejudice is best addressed at trial, as I suggest below. I would go further,
however, and argue that the government’s interest in trying an accused is
sufficiently strong in the case of any felony or violent misdemeanor to justify
forcible medication of an incompetent defendant for the purpose of restoring
competence. All felonies and violent misdemeanors are serious crimes
because both have the potential to result in stigma and serious prison time,
the interests In re Winship62 adduced when holding that the constitution
required the state to bear the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt
on all the elements of the crime. A criminal prosecution is an extremely
serious matter. Neither the case nor the prosecution and defense should
remain in limbo while an incompetent defendant languishes in a hospital
untreated. The incompetence standards and consequences are not meant to
be used strategically by either side. What is the point of keeping an
incompetent defendant in a hospital to restore competence if restoration is
made impossible by treatment refusal or by refusal to treat without informed
consent? The intrusion of forcible medication is not trivial, to be sure, but
neither is it so extensive that it should block the progress of the case. It is not
a form of thought control or any other type of unjustifiable intervention.
Forcible medication simply tries to restore the person’s cognitive control and
ability to test reality. Moreover, hospitalization is expensive and should be
terminated as soon as possible. Finally, no good alternative usually presents
itself.
Professor Christopher Slobogin63 proposed that the criteria should be
simplified to permit forcible medication if the defendant is charged with a
felony and if it is medically appropriate. I have already argued that violent
misdemeanants should also be included and I think he gives too little weight
to the possibility of trial prejudice. So few defendants go to trial that that this
is not a serious practical problem, but in the relatively few cases in which it
is a problem, it should be addressed, albeit at trial and not in the initial
medication decision. Thus, we may not disagree on this issue. Professor
Slobogin also worries reasonably that the Harper rule, whereby prisoners
who are mentally disordered and dangerous may be medicated, can be used
to undermine the integrity of Sell’s limiting criteria, primarily because the
meaning of dangerousness is not clear. Consider again the Supreme Court’s Jones
decision in which shoplifting was considered sufficient danger to justify indefinite
post-insanity acquittal commitment. In other words, the state may use Harper as a
pretext for avoiding Sell to restore competence. I agree that this is a problem that
needs clarification. If Harper is being used for that pretextual purpose, it is an
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abuse that must be ceased. If there is no pretense, then the state has two
independent justifications for forcible medication that may be used in
appropriate cases. Non-pretextual use of Harper forcibly to medicate that
restores competence as a side-benefit is not an abusive practice.
Many defendants have been and will be medicated, so we must address in
detail how possible prejudice can be avoided. Appropriately dosed
medication is more likely to restore the defendant's ability to appear and
respond appropriately, rather than to flatten his or her affect to a degree that
conveys a potentially deleterious impression of unconcern. If altered demeanor
does seem to risk undue prejudice either to an insanity defense or more
generally, there are reasonable remedies. Expert witnesses can explain the
effects of the drugs to the jury and the judge can issue cautionary instructions.
If there is a bench trial, the dangers would be further reduced. On the other hand,
cautionary instructions are often ineffective and expert testimony may be less
salient than the appearance of the defendant.
It would be optimum if the trial judge held a brief hearing just prior to trial
to evaluate whether undue prejudice was likely to result from the competent
defendant's medicated condition, but for resolving most potential prejudice issues
other than the ability to communicate with counsel effectively, this determination
will be difficult to make in a context other than the trial itself. Consequently,
these potential problems can be best monitored at trial, when the judge will
have the opportunity carefully to observe the defendant's particular response to
medication. Thus, in most cases, defendants who are competent on medication
should be tried and the effects of potential prejudice should be assessed by the trial
judge at trial.
If prejudice seems too great at trial, the judge may have to halt the proceedings.
If too much prejudice has already been created or if the defendant cannot be
restored to competence by means that do not create undue prejudice within a
short period of time, the judge will have to declare a mistrial. The question
then is whether this mistrial is occasioned by "manifest necessity," that is,
conditions under which it is not unjust to re-try the defendant and double
jeopardy does not obtain. Trial judges have great discretion in these matters.
On the one hand, the defendant has been medicated at the prosecution's request
and the defendant may not have moved for a mistrial. On the other hand, the
state interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence is substantial, and the request
for forcible medication is not done to gain a tactical advantage but to advance
a constitutionally important value. Thus, manifest necessity should apply and
the defendant should be tried again if he can be restored to competence without
creating too much prejudice. Even if it is constitutionally permissible for a
state to re-try a defendant under these circumstances, a state may impose more
restrictive rules if it wishes. If the defendant cannot be restored to
competence without creating prejudice, the defendant should be declared
21

permanently incompetent.
If the defendant can prevent restoration or simply cannot be restored
without prejudice, rendering him permanently incompetent, then the
government must dismiss the charges, presumably with prejudice, and seek
involuntary civil commitment. This is an imperfect remedy because civil
commitment terms are relatively brief and not geared to people for whom
there is probably cause to believe a serious crime has been committed.
Perhaps, a special form of commitment is needed. For example, some
jurisdictions already have special forms of lengthy commitment for certain
classes of especially dangerous people who have been charged with a crime
but have not been convicted, and who are non-responsible and dangerous to
others.64 This would be a clear instance of preventive detention, but without
necessary treatment, such commitments are simply warehousing.
If this type of scheme were adopted, we should insist that the State prove
that the defendant did commit the crime to differentiate the subject from the
subject of traditional involuntary commitment. In addition, the State should
prove that the defendant is mentally disordered and dangerous, and the
defendant should have full due process protections and the right to periodic
review.65 For example, the types of protections applied to sexual predator
commitments, including the right to full adversary counsel and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, should be provided because so much loss of liberty is at
stake. Automatic review should be frequent, the review should be thorough
and include a hearing, and some provision for permitting the person
committed to challenge the commitment between automatic reviews should
be available. If the person could be forcibly treated in involuntary civil
commitment or in some form of special commitment under a different
rationale, then perhaps trial competence would be restored.
Finally, consider a question that Riggins explicitly reserved and Sell did not
address: Whether a defendant restored to competence may waive his right to
be competent by ceasing medication, assuming that cessation is for the
limited purpose of demonstrating his unmedicated mental state to the
factfinder. Weston argued that the defendant claiming a mental state defense
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has no absolute right to replicate on the witness stand his mental state at the
time of the crime. Weston used the following analogies: A defendant claiming a
reduction to voluntary manslaughter from murder based on a theory of
provocation and passion does not have the right to be enraged on the stand
and a defendant claiming an intoxication-based doctrine does not have the
right to appear in court drunk. On the other hand, most finders of fact probably
have experience with rage and intoxication, but much less experience with
manifest psychotic behavior. There may be particular evidentiary value in
observing the defendant unmedicated. Therefore, unless the defendant's
behavior would be unduly disruptive, perhaps the defendant should be
permitted to waive the right to be competent on a temporary basis.66 This may
appear inconsistent with the rationale for prohibiting trying incompetent
defendants, but neither accuracy nor autonomy seems substantially
compromised in these limited circumstances. If this were to be allowed, the
trial judge would have to make a careful inquiry into the validity of the
waiver, which could be temporary, with medication continuing after the
finder of fact has observed the un-medicated state. This would be timeconsuming and cumbersome, however, and I suspect it would seldom arise.
Unless the Supreme Court reverses decades of incompetence
jurisprudence, it is not possible to try incompetent defendants even in those
cases in which they could receive a fair trial. To permit this, however, would
solve many of the problems raised by Sell or by cases of seeming permanent
incompetence, allowing final resolution of the criminal justice process. One
may fairly ask how we could be sure that the trial would be fair, but I suggest
that this could be resolved at pretrial hearings. Everything depends on how
complicated the issues are and whether difficult strategic choices will be
necessary in which the defendant would be likely to disagree with the
attorney’s advice. We could also adopt various prophylactic rules, such as
requiring the prosecution to disclose evidence that may not pass the Brady v.
Maryland67 threshold of actual innocence evidence, but which arguably
favors the defense. In any case, the issue will not arise frequently because
most state and federal cases are resolved by plea bargains. Nonetheless, the
incompetence process would be rationalized in those cases in which going to
trial seems optimal and a fair trial would be possible despite incompetence. I
recognize that this is a controversial suggestion and the procedural
requirements to guarantee fairness would be complex, but, in principle, this
is a reform that could work.

66
67

See State v Hayes 389 A 2d 1379 (NH 1978).
Brady v Maryland 373 US 83 (1963).
23

Competence to Plead Guilty and to Waive Rights
In Godinez, recall that the Supreme Court was asked to impose a standard
of a so-called reasoned choice for cases involving competence to plead guilty
and to waive the right to counsel, a test, that was different from the standard
for incompetence to stand trial. The argument for doing so was that pleading
is more complicated than going to trial and therefore a different and
presumably higher standard was required to satisfy due process. The Court
refused to adopt a different test, holding that the competence to stand trial
standard was sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights as long as the waiver
of the right to trial and other constitutional protections was actually knowing
and voluntary. In his concurrence in Godinez, Justice Kennedy characterized
the requirement as “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” After all, a
defendant might be competent but might not actually understand what he is
doing as a result of confusion, marginal competence, or the like.
Requiring deeper or more detailed rational understanding risks
paternalism, but requiring less risks an unjust outcome. I have a preference
for limiting paternalism as much as possible and perhaps the Court’s
recognition that the defendant must actually waive his rights knowingly
partially remedies the vagueness of the general test. On the other hand,
defining knowing or intelligent is as vulnerable to manipulation as defining
competence itself. In short, evaluating any competence case is a normatively
fraught and difficult enterprise. I have no easy answer, but simply a policy
preference for keeping the bar relatively low to let most defendants over it.
This will maximize liberty, but the danger is that it will also unduly risk the
defendant’s ultimate liberty by potentiating the possibility of an irrational
outcome.
If the defendant is not competent to plead and to waive rights because he
has failed the competence to stand trial standard or a state-imposed higher
standard, the state should have a right to forcibly medicate so the defendant
can competently make a choice—to plead guilty--that is open to and
overwhelmingly chosen by most competent defendants. All the same reasons
to achieve finality that apply to competence to stand trial apply a fortiori in
this context. Once again, there is no need for lengthy treatment to decide if
the defendant is restorable.
Competence to Proceed Pro Se
This issue seems straightforward. If the defendant is competent to stand
trial, he is probably going to be competent to make a treatment decision. If
he fails an Edwards standard and is not permitted to represent himself because
he has psychological abnormalities, then he will have every incentive to try
to alleviate those abnormalities so that he can represent himself. Thus, the
defendant should be told that either he can permit medication and perhaps be
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able to represent himself or a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. I
see no need for involuntary medication in this situation. The choice he is
offered respects his autonomy and dignity.
In the unlikely event that the defendant’s abnormalities do render him
incompetent to make a treatment decision even though he is competent to
stand trial, then a dilemma arises. Presumably his decision to represent
himself is competently made. The Edwards problem is not incompetence to
make a decision; it is that the defendant’s psychological abnormalities will
prevent him from meeting even the very low threshold for self-representation.
If he wants to go forward pro se despite having such disabilities, that may
indicate that his decision is not rational and perhaps he is not competent to
stand trial either. It is simply not clear. In this case, I would permit forcible
medication both to insure trial competence and to provide the strongest
possibility of the defendant becoming sufficiently capable to overcome
Edwards concerns.
Competence to be Sentenced
It is inconsistent with both the offender’s dignity and autonomy and the
dignity of the law to impose a punishment on an offender who does not
understand what is happening. Moreover an incompetent offender cannot
adequately participate in the sentencing process, which may make it more
difficult for the defense to argue for mitigation, thus reducing the fairness of
the sentencing process.
Unlike the defendant incompetent to stand trial who is presumed
innocent, the defendant incompetent to be sentenced has been convicted and
is lawfully in custody (or is perhaps out on bail, but still under criminal justice
restraint). The offender has a clear interest in being free of unwanted mindaltering medication, but both the individual’s interest and the government’s
interest in sentencing a convicted defendant are also strong. If the offender
is a danger to himself or others in custody—whether in a jail or a hospital—
Harper permits his involuntary medication, and he may thereby also be
restored to competence to be sentenced.
Suppose, however, that there is no Harper justification? I would permit
the state to medicate the offender as long as it was medically appropriate and
less restrictive alternatives, such as psychosocial therapies, were unavailing.
Defendants incompetent to be sentenced are probably not competent to refuse
treatment for the same reasons that defendants incompetent to stand trial are
probably not competent to refuse. Retaining a psychotic, unsentenced convict
in a jail is cruel, and hospitalization, which is more expensive than a prison,
is an unjustified use of resources. If the defendant is on bail and is not
dangerous, treatment could be accomplished in the community on an
outpatient basis. There is systemic value in reaching final resolution of
25

questions a case presents and a rational convicted defendant also should want
finality.
If the offender simply cannot be restored or there is otherwise reason to
avoid involuntary medication, the court could impose a conditional sentence
and retain the person in a hospital or perhaps in prison if the latter can manage
the person. I assume that, as a practical matter, the sentence would be the
maximum for the crime of conviction. If there had been a plea bargain and
sentence was part of the agreement, then the sentence would be for the agreed
term. If at any point the convict is restored to competence, either by agreeing
to take medicine or by spontaneous recovery, the court can then impose a
final sentence. If the defendant is never restored to sentencing competence,
then he would be released at the end of the conditional sentence.
4. Conclusion
All individuals, including defendants and prisoners in the criminal justice
system, have a strong substantive liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medical interventions, such as psychotropic medication. On the other hand,
the state in most cases has a strong interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence
and in completing the consequences of guilt, such as sentencing and
punishment. I have termed this the state interest in finality. If forcible
medication is used appropriately after proper procedures to restore
competence, I believe the state interest should prevail.
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